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Abstract This paper investigates how firms’ market power affects the price level.
Based on a small macro-model it is shown empirically that firms have structural
markup pricing power and take advantage of favourable business cycle
fluctuations. To this aim, a multivariate time series model with double integrated
variables is estimated. Thereby a model-based business cycle indicator can be
derived. Its information content is confronted with survey data giving rise to what
is going to be called semantic cross validation approach.
Keywords Markup pricing . I(2) cointegration analysis . Semantic cross
validation . Business tendency surveys
1 Introduction
The Swiss economy is sometimes considered as an agglomeration of companies
contending in a monopolistic competition. This is equivalent to saying that a
considerable share of firms can pursue markup pricing where the markup is added
to the marginal costs and depends on the elasticity of demand.
In this paper we extend the framework by suggesting that the stance of the
business cycle may equip firms with additional or reduced pricing power,
depending on whether the economy experiences a boom or a recession. In order to
do so, a small, fairly standard partial macro-model is derived which describes price
setting behaviour in the economy. It shows that the potency to set prices varies due
to demand fluctuations and due to variations in technological progress. These
variations can be estimated and it is shown that their impact on prices conforms
with the theory. This leads to the conclusion that these estimated demand
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fluctuations can also be used as a business cycle indicator as it has been suggested
by Granger and Jeon (2003). Owing to the origin of the indicator, it will be labelled
economic filter in order to distinguish it from the technical approaches provided by
among others the Hodrick–Prescott filter, the Beveridge–Nelson decomposition,
structural time series analysis and so on.
The theoretical approach yields an implicit identification problem because
pricing power (the markup) has two different sources. This paper addresses the
identification issue by recurring to the large information set gathered in business
tendency survey over the past decades. A demand pressure indicator is employed to
check whether the empirical business cycle indicator can be attributed to demand
shocks. It turns out that it does. While on the one hand this can be understood as
support for the economic model, it can likewise be considered as a guideline for
choosing survey data being particularly important for assessing the stance of the
economy. This choice is independent of the particular semantic content of the
survey data, yet depends on the observable effects on macro economic variables it
can be associated with. This procedure is thus a two-ways issue and can hence be
considered a semantic theory cross validation approach.
The work is motivated by the general search for a parsimoniously parametrised
macroeconomic model for the Swiss economy of which this analysis is a building
block. Previous attempts are mainly due to Stalder (1994, 1995) who also pointed
out the advantages of survey data use. Banerjee et al. (2001, 2002) can be
considered closely related studies where, however, specific labour cost data is used
and Switzerland is not included in the country surveys.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, the theoretical model is
briefly sketched, second, the data for the empirical applicationwill be described and the
empirical model will be set up. Then, the implied business cycle indicator is calculated
and compared to a measure based on survey data. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.
2 The model economy and prices setting
The technology in the model economy is described by its principal input which is
labour. Likewise, for simplicity, we assume that the cost of production is a function of
labour input. With stable and low real interest rates this does seem to be an acceptable
restriction.
We assume that the representative firm has some market power and can thus
maximise income by equating marginal revenue and marginal costs. However,
since revenues also depend on the demand for the output, the price firms can set
will depend on demand and this will affect the choice of labour input.
Thus, the economy is described by
production Qt ¼ Q Ltð Þ; @Q@L > 0;
costs Ct ¼ C Q Ltð Þð Þ; @C@L ¼ @C@Q @Q@L;
demand Pt ¼ P Q Ltð Þð Þ; @P@L ¼ @P@Q @Q@L ;
demand elasticity ηt ¼ η Pt;Qtð Þ; η1t ¼ @P@Q QtPt with ηt < 1;
where Qt is the quantity of goods produced and sold at the market, Lt stands for
labour input which is paid the wage Wt, and Pt is the price per unit of output. It is
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further assumed that the marginal costs of output are a function of wages and an
exogenous factor, say τt , that represents mainly so-called labour augmenting
technological progress and all other systematic components of the marginal costs
for which more detailed information is not available. A workable specification is
given by @C@Q ¼ a1Wa2t τa3t ; a3 > 0 and can be understood as some not too restrictive
functional form. The assumption about a3 should reflect the consideration that
marginal costs decrease with technical progress. In some of the related literature,
marginal costs enter the estimation procedure directly as unit labour costs.
Unfortunately, for Switzerland this information is not available. Supposing,
however, that wages are the most important marginal cost factor, this paper’s
approach can be considered equivalent to the approach taken, for example, by
Banerjee et al. (2001) who cover exogenous factors such as technical progress by
unit labour costs.
The firms maximise
max
Lt
PtQt  Ct
and the first order condition can be given as
@Q
@L
@P
@Q
Qt þ Pt
 
¼ @C
@L
: (1)
After expanding the first term in brackets, and substituting for the definitions
given above we obtain
Pt 1þ η1t
  ¼ a1Wa2t τa3t
Pt ¼ 1þ η1t
 1
a1W
a2
t τ
a3
t :
(2)
According to Eq. 2 firms’ markup over marginal costs is (1+ηt
−1)−1 and prices
will principally be ruled by the evolution of wages. However, the literature knows
various ways to link the markup also to inflation. One of them is the indirect
relation via the so-called relative price variability (RPV) and the markup, for
example. It claims that RPV is also a determinant of inflation. Such an argument
has been put forth by Mankiw’s (1985) ‘menu cost’ type model, or by Lach and
Tsiddon’s (1992) model which is in the Lucas’ island model vicinity. The latter also
provide empirical evidence as partly do Banerjee et al. (2002) who also give a more
detailed account of the relevant literature.
Within the chosen approach, a link between inflation and markup can also be
established. Key to understanding this relationship is the notion of profits being a
nonlinear function of the demand elasticity which leads to nonlinear first and
second partial derivatives.1 In order to keep the exposition concise the details are
referred to the Appendix. Here, it is simply noted that the empirical model should
allow a role for inflation in the long-run equilibrium 2. To facilitate estimation it
should be assumed that the shape of the demand curve is more or less stable while
its position in the quantity-price space is subject to demand shocks. This implies to
consider the possibility that firms do not always supply at the optimal point of the
1 The nonlinearity is also preserved in the log-linear econometric version of the model.
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demand curve. Occasionally this may result in too high or too low output relative to
the optimal supply given by actual demand for goods which will be known only at
a later stage.
This paper mimics previous investigations of the price-wage dynamics for
countries like Australia, United States, United Kingdom, and other G7 countries
like by e.g. Banerjee and Russell (2000), Banerjee et al. (2001, 2002). This paper
also extends the existing literature in that it explicitly investigates the role of
demand shocks for the price and wage setting. Bils (1987) and Banerjee et al.
(2001), for example, assume also that demand shocks play a role in the short run,
but they refrain from including a demand shock proxy in their econometric model
that would enable them to assess the impact directly. If, however, demand shocks
are excluded then any unexplained variation in Pt could be attributed to shocks to
the markup without ever having the chance to distinguish between demand shocks
and other disturbances. It will be shown below that unexpected variation in demand
very likely plays a significant role for explaining the markup in Switzerland.
3 Empirical analysis
The theoretical model links wages, prices, income, labour productivity, inflation
and demand elasticity. We use prices and wages as the endogenous variables,
taking the logarithm of Eq. 2 and re-arranging, one can write
pt  a2wt  log a1ð Þ ¼ ρt  ηt (3)
where ηt*= log (1 + ηt
−1), ρt ¼ log τa3tð Þ and the convention applies that lower
case letters indicate the logarithms of the variable defined in upper case letters. We
may consider the following decomposition of the r.h.s. term of Eq. 3
ηt ¼ b0 þ b1t þ b2"1;t (4)
ρt ¼ c0 þ c1t þ c2"2;t (5)
where ɛi,t, i =1, 2 is a zero mean stochastic variable. Under the assumption that the
shape of the demand curve remains constant, b1= 0 must hold and b0 defines the log
of the average markup. Furthermore, summing up ηt* and ρt and defining
δ0 = b0− c0− log(a1), δ1 = −c1, δ2 = −a2, and ɛt= c2ɛ2,t− b2ɛ1,t gives rise to the
following estimable version of Eq. 2
pt þ δ2wt þ δ1t þ δ0 ¼ "t: (6)
Since c0 and a1 are components of marginal costs, δ0 does not identify the
markup on marginal costs. Labellingɛ"1,t andɛ"2,t as demand and supply shocks,
respectively, it is clear that ɛt cannot be attributed to either demand or supply
shocks alone. It is noteworthy that Eq. 6 does not assign a role to inflation. It is
"
"
""
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shown in the Appendix, however, that inflation may well play a role. Therefore, yet
another econometric version of Eq. 2 needs to be considered:
pt þ δ3Δpt þ δ2wt þ δ1t þ δ0 ¼ "t: (7)
3.1 Data and data properties
Prior to running a straightforward regression of Eq. 7 we report the choice of the data
and investigate their time series properties. The prices will be represented by the
seasonally adjusted chain index deflator of the gross domestic product at factor costs
and excluding housing and public service prices. Wages are paid to workers and white
collar employees excluding the self-employed. For both variables we use indexes. The
deflator is calculated on a quarterly basis while wages are reported once a year by the
Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. In order to obtain quarterly figures, the Swiss
Institute for Business Cycle Research (KOF) at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich (ETHZ) uses a linear interpolation. A graphical impression of wt
and pt is provided in Fig. 1.
Unit root tests, albeit not fully consistent with one another, indicate that prices and
wages may be driven by stochastic trends with an order of integration of two, denoted
I(2). Therefore, in the following amultivariate cointegration framework is used that is
capable of I(2) stochastic trends.2
2 Refer to Table 4 in the Appendix for details of the test statistics.
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
3.9
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4.1
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4.6
Wage index (log) 
GDP price index at factor costs excluding housing and public service (log) 
Fig. 1 Wage and price data (in logs)
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3.2 Economic and econometric hypotheses
Using the notation I(d) to indicate integration of degree d we state the following
hypotheses about the properties of coefficients and terms in Eq. 3. Throughout we
make use of the assumptions that ηt is stationary (I(0)).
No. Hypothesis Interpretation
H10 δ2 < 0, δ1 > 0 Price equation holds
H20 H10 ^ "t  I 0ð Þ ^ δ3 ¼ 0 Trend stationary technical progress
H30 H10 ^ "t  I 1ð Þ First difference stationary technical progress
H40 H10 ^ "t  I 2ð Þ Second difference stationary technical progress
H50 H20 ^ "t  I 0ð Þ ^ δ3 6¼ 0 Markup and inflation are cointegrated
The above scheme makes use of the proposition that the markup can be accounted
for by either supply shocks (changes in labour productivity ≡ technical progress) or
demand shocks. Very often, the markup is simply understood as varying without
making reference to particular reasons, see e.g. Banerjee et al. (2001). The analysis
naturally focuses onH10; although the choice of the estimation technique depends on
H20 toH40: As noticed before,ɛ"t is the sum of shocks to the technical progress and to
the elasticity of goods demand. In general, it will be impossible to disentangle these
two. Therefore, instead of assuming a stationary shape of the demand curve, a random-
walk-like behaviour could be considered. In fact, even linear combinations of I(2)
demand and productivity shocks could be supposed which are either I(0), I(1) or I(2).
Furthermore, Banerjee et al. (2001) using Australian data find that the I(1) markup
cointegrates with inflation to a stationary variable. The corresponding precondition for
that is hypothesis H50 here.
3.3 System cointegration analysis
The estimation of Eq. 3 will now be set in a multivariate time series model. We
follow Rahbek et al. (1999) who provide an asymptotic theory for the Johansen
(1992) two-step approach with trending variables. The empirical model reads
yt ¼ pt;wtð Þ0
yt ¼ ðy
0
t; t Þ
0
Δ2yt ¼ Πyt1 þ ΓΔyt1 þ
Xp2
i¼1
Γ iΔ
2yti þ μ0 þ μ1t þ ut
Π ¼ αβ0
α
0
?Γβ? ¼ ξν0
(8)
where α and β are (n×r), r ≤ n matrices of full column rank, with n denoting the
dimension of the process. Likewise ξ and ν are ((n−r)×s) matrices of full column
rank with s < n−r. We define the (n×m) matrix κ⊥ as the orthogonal complement to
κ (n×m) with κ⊥′κ = 0m×m. Finally, Γi are coefficient matrices, μ0 and μ1 account
for trends and ensure that the vector of innovations, ut has zero mean. It is
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assumed that μ0 and μ1 are restricted such that at most linear trends in yt are
present (see p. 267 in Rahbek et al. 1999).
We can now relate the hypotheses formulated in Section 3.2 to r and n − r− s as
follows.
No. Hypothesis Interpretation r, n− r− s
H10 a1 > 0, δ1 > 0 Price equation holds 1, 1 or 1, 0
H20 H10 ^ "t  I 0ð Þ ^ δ3 ¼ 0 Trend stationary technical progress 1, 1 or 1, 0
H30 H10 ^ "t  I 1ð Þ First different stationary technical progress 0, 1 or 0, 0
H40 H10 ^ "t  I 2ð Þ Second different stationary technical progress 0, 2
H50 H20 ^ "t  I 0ð Þ ^ δ3 6¼ 0 Markup and inflation are cointegrated 1, 1 or 1, 0
It may be noteworthy that the sets of r and n− r− s are not unique for each
hypothesis (see last column). They are, however, unique across lines two to four.
All these hypotheses except H50 can be tested in the framework of Rahbek et al.
(1999) and the choice of r and swill determine the way the parameters in Eq. 10 are
going to be estimated. Table 1 reports the results. The tests are based on Eq. 8 with
p = 6 being chosen according to the Akaike information criterion. The seemingly
Table 1 Hypotheses tests about the cointegration rank
Model 8 with p= 6, sample period: 1982q4 – 2002q4
Basic model D83q3 included
Cointegration test
r S(r, s) Q(r) S(r, s) Q(r)
0 60.38 36.44 31.94 52.65 32.28 27.59
47.60 34.36 25.43 – – –
1 – 14.02 7.30 – 11.99 3.72
– 19.87 12.49 – – –
n− r − s 2 1 0 2 1 0
Specification analysis for Eq. 8 with r= s = 0, p= 6
Log-lik 738.572 – 744.979 –
Portm 9 24.30 – 25.10 –
AR 1–5 F(20, 112) = 1.87 [0.02] F(20, 110) = 0.90 [0.59]
Normality χ2(4) = 13.30 [0.01] χ2(4) = 15.12 [0.00]
Hetero F(78, 114) = 0.80 [0.85] F(78, 111) = 0.52 [0.99]
D83q3 is short for impulse dummy (third quarter of 1983) included as an unrestricted variable in
Eq. 8
Estimation for the model with r= s= 0 is performed with PcGive10.0
Upper part: the 5% critical values (if applicable) are given in italics below the test statistics (see
Table 1 of Rahbek et al. 1999). Statistics are calculated with Clara Jørgensen’s procedure for Cats
in Rats (see Rahbek et al. 1999)
Lower part: the specification test are based on residual vector analysis and regard the log-
likelihood value (‘log-lik’), presence of autocorrelation (Portmanteau test for nine lags, ‘Portm 9’
and F-test, ‘AR 1–5’), normality (χ2 -test, ‘Normality’) as well as heteroscedasticity (F-test,
‘Hetero’) of the residual distribution. Marginal significance levels are given in brackets if
available and degrees of freedom in parentheses
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large lag order might be considered a result of the linear interpolation of the wage
data series. A plot of the residual indicates an outlier at 1983 third quarter which is
accounted for by a dummy variable in an alternative analysis. The testing
procedure reported in Table 1 is a sequential one which can be read from left to
right and top to bottom. Each of the entries represents a hypothesis about the
process 8. For example, in the top left corner (upper part of Table 1, basic model) it
is assumed that r= 0 and n− r− s= 2 which implies that Π and Γ are both zero and
hence no long-run restrictions are imposed on the variables. This is a more general
model than the one defined by the hypothesis next to the right: r= 0 and
n− r− s= 1, and so on. It might be worth noting that the last column refers to a
system with only I(1) variables in yt. The sequence of tests stops when the
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the first time. The asymptotic 0.05 critical value
for each hypothesis can be found below the test statistics if available.
According to Table 1 the sequence ceases at the hypothesis H20 : r ¼ 1;
n − r − s= 1, and hence s= 0. This result corresponds to the following first largest
four eigenvalues of the companion matrix of Eq. 8 (at p= 6, r= s= 0): 0.9768,
0.9557, 0.9557, 0.78 of which the first two are not found to deviate significantly
from one.3 Considering the third eigenvalue as one, would imply that there is no
cointegration (r= 0), accepting only one unit eigenvalue would render the system I
(1). The experiences with sequential system cointegration tests for I(1) models
show that very often there is a power problem implying that the test procedure
stops ‘too early’ (too low a r is chosen) if p is relatively large. Likewise, accounting
for outliers (see the right hand side columns in the upper part of Table 1 labelled
D83q3) by the inclusion of dummies may further reduce the power of the test
which also implies that the test sequence stops ‘too early’. Augmenting this finding
to the I(2) case by analogy, it seems justified to summarize the evidence by
regarding r= 1 and s= 0 an acceptable description of the data generating process.
Based on the comparison of the log-likelihood values for the model alternatives
with and without dummy variable, we maintain the dummy in all the following
analysis.
Putting it less technically, the tests show that one linear combination of the
endogenous variables in levels and in first differences (as well as a time trend)
exists which is stationary (I(0)). In general, this linear combination is a so-called
polynomial cointegration relationship between a linear combination of the
endogenous variables in levels and a combination of the endogenous variables
in first differences. The most prominent candidate for such a polynomial
cointegration relation is a relation between pt + δ2wt+ δ1t + δ0 and Δpt which
underlines the role δ3.
UnderH20 and at p = 6 the estimates are: bδ1 ¼ :0032; bδ2 ¼ 1:152 (estimates
of coefficients and variables are indicated by ˆ).4 We can now put forth further
hypotheses about the coefficients and thereby confirm their statistical significance.
3 This result is relatively robust with respect to the variation of p. For 3 ≤ p≤ 6 the largest
eigenvalue is always larger than 0.95, the second and third largest are above 0.9, and the fourth
does not exceed 0.78. At p= 7 the four largest eigenvalues are 0.9266, 0.9266, 0.88, 0.88.
4 An anonymous referee has pointed out that b1 implies an annual productivity growth rate of
1.25% which approximately matches the observed sample period’s average annual productivity
growth rate.
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For example, H50: δ2 ¼ 1 (linear homogeneity) and H60: δ1 ¼ 0 (zero log-linear
productivity growth) have been tested to the effect that both hypotheses
individually and jointly had to be rejected at the 0.00 level of significance. At
the same time H10 cannot be rejected.
The estimation of δ3 is a bit more involved. Before turning to this issue we note
that the polynomial cointegration relation can be written as
β0yt þ γβ?Δyt (9)
where γ is a scalar and the representation follows from r = 1, n = 2 and α
0
?Γβ? ¼ 0
(see Section 4.3 in Johansen 1995). Thus, we can state the intermediate result.
Under H20 the following is a stationary relationship5
"^t ¼ pt  1:152wt þ :0032t þ γ :933Δpt þ :810Δwtð Þ þ δ0: (10)
We now confirm that γ ≠ 0 by noting that β′yt* is not integrated of degree higher
than 1 and β⊥Δyt
* cannot be I(0). In line with Kongsted (2005), Johansen and
Lütkepohl (2005) we can consider the following autoregressive model in the I(1)
space
ΔXt ¼ ~α ~β 0Xt1 þ
Xp2
i¼1
~Γ iΔXti þ ΦZt þ ~ut (11)
with Xt ¼ X1;tX2;t
 
¼ β
0yt
β 0?Δyt
 
; ~ut ¼ β
0u1;t
β 0?u2;t
 
and where ~β ¼ 1
γ
 
is the
parameter vector of interest. The vector Zt is a vector with exogenous variables. For
the time being D83q3 is its only component. We replace β and β⊥ in Eq. 11 by their
estimates and first test for cointegration.6 If the variables in Eq. 8 were really I(2)
we would expect the rank of ~β to be exactly 1 in Eq. 11. However, in line with the
assumption that the variables in yt contain I(2) components, the appropriate null
hypothesis has to consider the possibility that the I(2) to I(1) transformation may
have gone fail. Therefore, the cointegration analysis is based on a model like Eq. 8
with Xt and Xt−1 being used instead of yt and yt*−1 respectively. The test results are
provided in Table 2. At the 5% level of significance the order of integration is 1
with one cointegrating vector being present. Including a dummy and using the
same table of critical value the same result is obtained at the 10% level. This result
leaves two possibilities. Either γ= 0 and, hence β′yt*∼ I(0) or, γ ≠ 0 and β′yt* would
be cointegrating with β⊥Δyt
* to a stationary process.
As Johansen and Lütkepohl (2005) note, the hypothesis γ= 0 can be tested
within model 11 as a hypothesis on ~β if β was known. The corresponding
likelihood-ratio-statistic would be χ2 distributed with one degree of freedom. In
our case β is estimated, however. The likelihood-ratio-statistic may therefore not
follow the χ2 distribution exactly.7 It can be argued, however, that due to the fact
5 The estimation is performed with Cats in Rats.
6 Summary statistics for residual properties are provided in Table 3.
7 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for valuable advise on the issue.
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that the evidence as of Table 2 points to a valid I(2) to I(1) transformation and
presence of a cointegrating relation in Xt, the corresponding cointegration
parameter (γ) will be superconsistently estimated and hence χ2 distribution applies
asymptotically. The empirical test statistics is found to be 14.55 and thus the
hypothesis γ= 0 can be rejected under the conditions mentioned before. Moreover,
since the property of cointegration is not lost when replacing β⊥Δyt* byΔpt we are
able to calculate δ^3 from the estimate for γ in Eq. 11. We obtain γ^ ¼ 1:19
(standard error: 0.2). Considering further that Δpt− (1.152Δwt)∼ I(0) and
therefore, in the long-run Δwt = 1/1.152Δpt leads to δ^3 ¼ 1:95: Thus, H05
finally finds support and we have
"^t ¼ pt  1:152wt þ :0032t  1:95Δpt þ :468: (12)
This relationship will be considered the empirical, inflation adjusted markup-
relationship, while
dmut ¼ pt  1:152wt þ :0032t (13)
will be called the markup-relationship and considered I(1). Finally, for mainly
expositional reasons we also define
"^t ¼ pt  1:152wt þ :0032t  1:19 :933Δpt þ :810Δwtð Þ þ :468: (14)
as the price and wage inflation adjusted markup relation. It might be worth noting
that Eq. 12 implies a positive relation between the markup and inflation. This is a
finding that does not correspond to the findings by e.g. Banerjee et al. (2001, 2002),
and Banerjee and Russell (2000) who also rule out this possibility altogether on
theoretical grounds. In contrast, however, to their approach the relation between
markup and inflation is not motivated by considering costs of inflation rather than
by optimal behaviour under uncertainty. That’s why, the actual relation depends on
the properties of the demand for goods and may result in a positive, negative or
zero correlation between markup and inflation. However, owed to the lack of truly
Table 2 Hypotheses tests about the cointegration rank for Xt
Model 8, yt=Xt, yt−1* =Xt−1, p=6,
Sample period: 1982q4–2002q4
Basic model D83q3 included
r S(r, s) Q(r) S(r, s) Q(r)
0 84.46 52.91 31.76 80.88 48.18 31.43
36.12 26.00 19.96 – – –
1 – 20.30 6.23 – 12.05 6.50
12.93 9.24 – –
n−r−s 2 1 0 2 1 0
D83q3 is short for impulse dummy (third quarter of 1983) included as an unrestricted variable in
Eq. 8. Estimation for the model with r=s=0 is performed with PcGive10.0. The 5% critical values
in italics below the test statistics (if applicable) are from Paruolo (1996), Table 5
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comparable data, a comparison to the aforementioned results could only be made
on very weak basis.
4 Semantic cross validation
In Eq. 12 we obtained an estimate for the time varying part of the inflation adjusted
markup on marginal costs. It has been argued before, that this measure should
follow business cycle fluctuations caused by demand and labour productivity
variation. Due to the fact that economic theory underlies Eq. 12 we can argue that "^t
represents a business cycle indicator obtained by economic filtering as opposed to
(purely) technical filters like HP-filter or structural time series analysis. The
indicator "^t can also be seen as an application of Granger and Jeon’s (2003) time–
distance measure. It should furthermore be pointed out that such an indicator has
the advantage that its numerical values can directly be associated with precise
statements about the expected reaction of the economy. Technically derived
indicators do not have this kind of ‘natural’ interpretation. Moreover, providing
quantitative statements does not necessarily depend on the identifiability of the
components of the indicator like demand and supply shock as in our case.
Summarising the arguments one could regard the economic filter as an example
where the measure’s implication has a specific semantic content while the reason
for the effect may be largely unknown due to the infinite universe of interpretations
which one might attach to "^t . There exists, however, another class of information
where the situation is more or less the opposite. This class is business tendency
survey data (BTS data). This data is generated by means of specific semantic
questions. For example, respondents may be asked if they expect lower, equal, or
higher inflation in the next period. After appropriate aggregation of the answers
this information could be used as information about inflation expectations. It can be
supposed that the semantic content of this data is known. What is not known,
however, is the implications for the economy.
As a consequence of the above considerations, this paper uses independent
information from both sources as complements. Taken together they should
provide a consistent picture with additional insight none of them could generate
alone. Looking from the perspective of the economic filter, a comparison to BTS
data should shed light on the identification problem. On the other hand, the BTS
data can be assessed not only by means of its nominal semantic content but also by
what it implies in terms of the economy’s development. This comparison of two
independently generated information sets with a common semantic basis shall be
called semantic cross validation; an example of which is given in the following.
The KOF conducts a large number of surveys in Switzerland which attempt to
give a reliable picture of the economy. In order to facilitate semantic cross
validation we should look for information about (unexpected) marginal cost and
demand fluctuations. Two principal methods to identify such data could be thought
of. The first could be a regression or correlation analysis of "^t and potential data
where the series with the largest correlation or explanatory power could then be
considered. The preferred alternative naturally seems to be a look at the semantics
of the survey questions. Following Stalder (1994) we pick the responses to the
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inquiry about capacity constraints in the industry. At a later stage of this project,
further series are going to be scrutinised in the same way.
The capacity question inquires whether firms’ technical capacities are too low,
sufficient, or too high. Naturally, in the absence of shocks, technical capacities will
always be chosen such that firms supply the(ir) optimal equilibrium amount. If this
is not the case firms are facing a shock requiring them to adjust capacities in the
aftermath. The difference between firms reporting too high and too low capacities
can thus be used to approximate the state of the business cycle in the sense that
shocks push firms away from their point of optimal capacity utilisation. Since the
production technology and hence costs of production is private information,
inappropriate capacities should be due to exogenous factors, the most important
being demand shocks. This variable, denoted πt, will be compared to "^t in the
following.
First, a unit root analysis is conducted for πt. If πt and "^t are ought to be similar,
πt should feature mean reverting behaviour and finite variance as does "^t . Strictly
speaking, the survey data should be stationary by definition, therefore, the
statistical test is not really necessary. It is nevertheless conducted and supports the
stationarity hypothesis (test statistics are reported in Table 4). Second, plotting
these two variables adjusted for their means and variances, reveals that they both
are strikingly similar in their evolution over time. This can be confirmed from
Fig. 2.
A statistical analysis shows that the correlation between πt and "^t is 0.31 while
it is 0.34 between πt and "^t . Furthermore, a formal OLS regression of "^t "^

t
 
on πt
and a constant shows a significant linear relationship. The corresponding t-value of
the coefficient on πt is 2.03 (2.15) when corrected for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation of the residuals. That’s why one can conclude that there is enough
evidence to reject the hypothesis that "^t "^t
 
and πt to a significant extent do not
represent the same information.
In the following, the residual series corresponding to the regression of "^t on πt and
a constant is going to be called "^π;t . We define a π

t which obeys to π

t ¼ "^t  "^π;t and
has the useful property to be uncorrelated with "^π;t but to preserve all necessary
information about πt.
8
The results of the cross validation exercise imply that a significant part of the
variance in "^t originates in demand shocks. On the other hand, the model provides
a tool for directly assessing the numerical relevance of the particular BTS data with
respect to wages and prices.
4.1 The business cycle, technology shocks, and dynamics of markup pricing
The following section tries to push the previous cross validation approach a bit
further by addressing two identification issues. The first deals with the possibility
to differentiate between demand shocks and technology shocks, the second looks at
8 Analytically, it does not matter whether we use "^t or "^t although "^t is easier to interpret
economically. The following computations are nevertheless based on "^t because it meant less
programming effort.
766 C. Müller
the response of the Swiss economy to a shock in order to confirm markup pricing
power.
4.1.1 Technology shocks
It has been found that the information content of "^t and πt is very similar. In
addition to the similarity, the differences might also be noteworthy. Having in mind
that the firms’ answers relate private decisions to the public demand for its goods, it
is a relation between endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous part
encompasses all parameters the firms can choose themselves subject to given
exogenous factors like the demand function and expectations about demand for
goods. The firms’ decision is the level of output (and hence prices) which is of
course closely related to the choice of inputs. This choice is in turn made subject to
the production function which is private information. The key argument here is that
while on a macro level the production function is a black box, it is not so at the firm
level. The production function naturally depends on the technology used and hence
determines labour productivity. Therefore, when answering the survey, firms can
be expected to accommodate technological shocks that have affected their
production function. This is because even if a new shock arrives, on the firm level
this innovation would first have to be implemented which implies that it enters the
decision and expectation-making process before the output level is chosen.
Consequently, πt should almost exclusively convey information about demand
shocks, the only major source of surprise for the firm. Thus, the informational
difference between "^t and πt might largely be attributed to technology shocks
affecting labour productivity. Of course, to the extent that ɛ1,t and ɛ2,t are cor-
related, πt is also informative about shocks to marginal costs, but an exact
differentiation appears unnecessary to the same extent.
4.1.2 The dynamics of markup pricing
So far, it had been shown that there is a linear relationship between prices, wages,
and a time trend that is following business cycle fluctuations. What is left though, is
to show that this indicator indeed equips firms with additional or reduced power to
raise prices. This, however, can easily be confirmed by checking that the
coefficients of α^ in Eq. 8 corresponding to the price equation are significant and
have the correct sign. Based on Eq. 8 and imposing the restrictions 14 we obtain
bα ¼ 0:043
0:111
 
: A likelihood ratio test confirms that the element of α^
corresponding to the equation for Δ2pt is statistically significant. The χ
2-statistic
with one degree of freedom amounts to 19.71.9
The basic consideration is that in complete markets firms would be price takers
and always supply at their marginal cost. In short, demand shocks would not affect
the price level while technology shocks would.
9 The computation is performed with Cats in Rats.
" "
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Figure 3 shows hypotheses about the potential dynamics in the stylized
economy. The reference point is Awhich corresponds to the optimal choice of the
firm given shape and position of the demand curve (DDÞ and the production
technology (and hence marginal costs). If demand would be higher due to larger
consumer budget, for example, this would be signified by an outward shift of the
demand curve to D0D0: The new optimal point would be A′ and the points along
this expansion line define the supply curve SS: For a given period of time, A is
optimal only if it is a point on the demand curve. The position of the latter,
however, is not known with certainty. It can only be considered to be the expected
demand from the viewpoint of the firms. The true position will be revealed when
the products are put on the market. For convenience, the situation of a positive
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
–0.49
–0.48
–0.47
–0.46
–0.45
–0.44
–0.43 capacity constraint indicator (πt)
estimated polynomial cointegration relationship (εt)
estimated markuprelation (mut)
^
^
Fig. 2 Graphical semantic cross validation
Fig. 3 Price-quantity adjustment after a positive demand shock
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demand shock will be considered. A negative shock would simply lead to opposite
conclusions. Such a shock is equivalent to a statement of too low capacities
compared to demand. Therefore, the realised demand is D0D0 and the desired
optimal point is A′. However, in the short run it might not be possible to jump to A′
directly because of capacity constraints or difficulties in adjusting prices. Thus, B
and C are extreme initial positions at the time of the shock where either only prices
(B) or quantities (C) are changed to arrive at D0D0:
According to the previous discussion, two adjustment paths are possible. Either
BA0
!
or CA0
!
: The first would imply that after a positive shock the firms initially
choose too high prices compared to the optimal A′. Therefore, a downward pressure
on prices has to follow the initial reaction. If output would be increased instead
(point C), then prices would rise in the aftermath of the shock. The simple test
therefore is a look at the adjustment path.
Restricted reduced form estimation The adjustment path will be given as an
impulse–response analysis of a temporary demand shock to Eq. 11 in conjunction
with Eq. 14. To this end, the immediate impact of a demand shock needs to be
accounted for and we have to separate the effect on b"t into demand related and all
other effects. Two simple modifications help to distinguish the effects.
We first add Δπt and πt−1* to the vector Zt. In this step, only Δπt provides
additional, original information since ~β0Xt1 already accounts for a significant
share of the variation in πt−i* . Second, in order to truly identify the effects due to πt in
Eq. 11, ~β0Xt1 is replaced by "^π;t1 . Table 3 (right hand part) has the details of the
corresponding summary model evaluation. The overall properties appear
satisfactory, although there is some indication of non-normality of the residuals.
It is now easy to apply a temporary shock to πt and to observe the responses that
are triggered in pt and wt.
10
A plot of the impulse–responses is given in Fig. 4. We report the effect on the
first 24 quarters, that is, for the first 6 years after the shock. The scale of the
responses is linear in the shocks, hence arbitrary and therefore not given.
Unfortunately, we are not able to say anything about the significance of the effects.
Therefore, the following has to be conditioned on the hypothesis that the true
responses are not zero. Note, however, that a simple test about the significance of
the information contained in πt is feasible by testing the joint significance of the
parameters corresponding to Δπt and πt−1
* In the more general restricted reduced
form model reported in Table 3 (right hand part) the α correspond to b"π;t1 yet not
to eβ0Xt1 as in the model reported in the left hand side. Therefore, the null
hypothesis of the survey data being not important in the data generating process
leads to a model that is more restrictive than simply switching off the coefficients
forΔπt and πt−1
* in Zt, and hence more restrictive than the model reported on the left
hand side of Table 3.
The corresponding likelihood-ratio statistic with four degrees of freedom
amounts to 8.54 with 0.07 as the p value. A test on the significance of πt−1* alone
10 Technically, the model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood with identity
equations added for πt, b"t , t , Δpt, pt, Δwt and wt and then a once-off shock is given to the
equation for t or b"t , respectively.
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gives χ2(2) = 6.94 having p value 0.03. It is therefore justified to consider the more
general model to be more appropriate than a model that completely disregards the
information provided by πt.
One might first look at the response of the endogenous variables to a temporary
positive change in the long-run equilibrium. It causes an increase in prices as well
as in wages which (bottom panels), however, is of a temporary nature. At the end of
the 6 years, a new price level is reached. Such a shock is, of course, hard to interpret
since it does reflect the effect of anything that may disturb the long-run equilibrium
without allowing a demand shock also to hit the system in the initial period. It does,
however, illustrate the equilibrium correction behaviour of the long-run equilib-
rium model.
Contrary to this shock, a pure demand shock has an effect which is consistent
with a jump from A to B (c.f. Fig. 3) in the initial period. This can be seen in the
Table 3 Summary statistics for restricted reduced form analyses
Model 11 and 14 with p= 6, sample period: 1982q4 – 2002q4
Zt=D83q3′ Zt= (D83q3, πt−i* , Δπt)′
Log-lik 677.656 679.701
Portm 9 34.96 35.63
AR 1–5 F(20, 128) = 1.25 [0.22] F(20, 124) = 1.93 [0.27]
Normality χ2(4) = 8.14 [0.09] χ2(4) = 12.17 [0.02]
Hetero F(105, 111) = 1.21 [0.16] F(108, 102) = 1.18 [0.20]
The results in the right part of the table refer to a model as in Eq. 11. However, ~~
0
Xt1 is replaced
by "^t;. The details are explained in the main text. Estimation is performed with PcGive10.0. See
Table 1 for further explanations
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
dotted line:   response to shock to the cointegration relation
solid line:    response to temporary demand shock
price inflation
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0
wage inflation
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0
price level
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0
wage level
Fig. 4 Impulse–responses to a shock to demand and to the inflation adjusted markup relation("^t ,
c.f. Eq. 14)
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bottom left panel of Fig. 4, where the price level jumps up in the period at which the
shock occurs. During the remaining periods the price level declines at declining
speed (see top left panel), which mimics a move from B to A′ and finally back to A
in Fig. 3 since the shock has temporary effects only. In our example the final price
level is below the initial one because we are estimating the model in the price-
wage-space rather than in the price-quantity-space. The model supposes wages to
be exogenous while in fact in the empirical application it is also endogenous.
Therefore, unless we restrict the final wage level to match the initial one, we cannot
expect the long-run value of the price level in the aftermath of the temporary shock
to coincide with the original price level.
5 Summary and outlook
This paper has suggested a semantic cross validation procedure that provides the
opportunity to complement economic analysis with business survey data sources. It
furthermore helped to address the identification problem and offered the possibility
for quantifiable interpretation of qualitative data.
The procedure has been demonstrated in a small macroeconomic model where
it has been shown that firms might have time varying power to conduct markup
pricing. This opportunity was attributed to the possibility of unexpected changes in
the strategic position of firms for optimal price setting. For example, firms could be
faced with a shift of the demand curve due to unpredicted events.
These results could be used for further research into - among other - the
following directions. The implicit measure of technological shocks could further be
scrutinised by comparison with more direct measure of innovations obtained by
survey data itself. Furthermore, since the demand shock indicator is a so-called
balance variable reporting the difference between the share of firms having excess
and too few capacities, it could be supposed that positive and negative demand
shocks may have different effects. Therefore, a more detailed investigation into this
aspect might be desirable.
Second, under the assumption that the principal source for variations in "^t are
shifts of the demand curve while the shape of the curve remains constant, one could
engage in estimating the demand curve in the price-quantity space. This would e.g.
require to extend the model in order to incorporate GDP income.
Finally, since the error correction term can be interpreted as a business cycle
indicator, the BTS data which is very closely related to this information set could
well be used as a business cycle indicator itself. Therefore, using BTS data in that
way would even have an edge over the approach by Granger and Jeon (2003) who
use observed disequilibrium errors which are available with a time lag only.
Furthermore, the BTS based indicator would not be subject to revisions and it
would in contrast to technical approaches not be dependent on assumptions about
the data generating process of, e.g. GDP. It would however, be dependent on the
supposed economic theory which in turn can in many cases be empirically rejected
or supported.
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Appendix
An extension of the basic economic model
We need to show that inflation can be linked to themarkup. DefinePt= ωPt
m+ (1−ω)
Pt
c with 0≤ ω ≤ 1 and Ptm, Ptc are the prices in the monopolistic and the perfect
competition sector of the economy, respectively. The procedure is as follows. It will
be shown that the demand elasticity in the monopolistic sector is affected by changes
in Pt
c. By assumption the firms in the competitive sector are price takers and hence
are not affected by Pt
m.11 Then, given that the same absolute change in the elasticity
has a different impact on profits depending on the sign of the change, it is argued that
the expected profit is maximised by choosing a price level that deviates from the one
given in Eq. 2. Thus, the first and second derivatives of profits with respect to the
demand elasticity need to be calculated and the two situations, one positive and the
other with negative expectation errors are to be compared to one another. Finally,
since Pt is a weighted average of Pt
m and Pt
c and labour is assumed to have the same
price everywhere in the economy it can be argued that the price setting behaviour of
the monopolistic sector is reflected in the economy wide aggregates of prices and
wages as it is done in the main text.
The demand elasticity and Pt
c
First, the behavioral equations are re-stated:
production Qt ¼ Q Ltð Þ; @Q
@Lt
> 0;
demand Pmt ¼ Pm Q Ltð Þ;Pct
 
;
@Pm
@Lt
¼ @P
m
@Q
@Q
@Lt
;
inverse demand Qt ¼ Q Pm Pct
  
;
@Q
@Pmt
< 0;
@Q
@Pct
>
<
0;
demand elasticity ηt ¼ η Pmt ;Qt
 
; η1t ¼
@Pm
@Q
Qt
Pmt
with ηt < 1:
The optimal solution conditional on Pt
c is equivalent to Eq. 2:
Pmt ¼ 1þ η1t
 1
a1W
a2
t τ
a3
t ; (15)
11 This assumption could also be dropped which would only mean a couple of more lines, yet not
change the main implications.
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We need to know the impact of Pt
c on ηt:
ηt ¼
@Q
@Pm
Pmt
Qt
¼ PmðQt;Pct Þ
@QðPmðPct ÞÞ
@PmðQt;Pct ÞQðPmðPct ÞÞ
;
and hence,
@η
@Pc
¼ @P
m Pct
 
@Pc
@Q Pm Pct
  
@Pm Qt;Pct
 
Q Pm Pct
  þ Pm Pct 
@
@Q Pm Pctð Þð Þ
@Pm Pctð ÞQ Pm Pctð Þð Þ
 
@Pc
¼ 1
Qt
@Pm
@Pc
@Q
@Pm
þ Pm Pct
  @ @Q Pm Pctð Þð Þ@Pm Pctð Þ 1Q Pm Pctð Þð Þ
 
@Pc
¼ 1
Qt
@Q
@Pc
þ Pm Pct
  @2Q
@Pm@Pc
 P
m Pct
 
Qt
@Q
@Pm
@Q
@Pc
 
¼ 1
Qt
@Q
@Pc
þ Pm Pct
  @2Q
@Pm@Pc
 ηt
@Q
@Pc
 
¼ 1
Qt
@Q
@Pc
1 ηtð Þ þ Pm Pct
  @2Q
@Pm@Pc
 
: (16)
Profit maximisation with perfect foresight
Next, we need to show that profits negatively depend on ηt. This is fairly simple
and can be confirmed in any textbook. It is nevertheless given here again for
completeness of the exposition. In Eq. 2 the profit maximising price is given in
terms of the elasticity. Taking first and second derivatives with respect to ηt
produces:
@Pm
@η
¼ 1
1þ ηtð Þ2
> 0 (17)
@2Pm
@ηð Þ2 ¼
2
1þ ηtð Þ3
> 0 (18)
due to ηt< −1. This result does not change when we are looking at the variables in
logs and therefore, the arguments hold also for the log–linear econometric model.
(16)
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Maximising expected profit
After aggregating the results 16–18 we can evaluate what firms do when they do
not know the realisation of Pt
c at the time they are planning production for
the period t. Naturally, firms will formulate expectations at t−1 conditional on the
information set It−1 about Pt
c which we denote Et−1(Pt
c). Based on this value, the
optimal price setting is given by Eq. 2. However, even if Et−1 (Pt
c −Et−1(Ptc)) = 0,
firms have an incentive to deviate from Eq. 2 if the variance of the expectation
error, is sufficiently large. To see this, notice that in the neighborhood of the
optimal price according to Eq. 2 changes in the elasticity will have asymmetric
effects on the profits. When demand becomes less elastic (Δηt> 0), then profits will
rise more than they would fall if demand would turn more elastic by the same
absolute value. From Eq. 16 we know that deviations of Pt
c from its expected value
can be regarded as expectation errors of ηt which we denote by ϱt. Therefore,
applying Eq. 18 and using a second order Taylor approximation of Pm around ϱt= 0
gives rise to
Pm ϱ tð Þ ¼ Pm Et1 ηtð Þð Þ þ
@Pm
@η
ϱ t þ
1
2
@2Pm
@ηð Þ2 ϱ
2
t :
After taking expectations we obtain
Et1 Pm ϱ tð Þð Þ ¼ Pm Et1 ηtð Þð Þ þ
@Pm
@η
Et1 ϱ tð Þ þ
1
2
@2Pm
@ηð Þ2 Et1 ϱ
2
t
 
¼ Pm Et1 ηtð Þð Þ þ
1
2
@2Pm
@ηð Þ2 Var ϱ t It1jð Þ:
(19)
Thus, when considering the uncertainty about Pt
c the optimal price deviates
from the solution in Eq. 2 by 12
@2Pm
@ηð Þ2 Var ϱ tjIt1ð Þ which is according to Eq. 16 linear
in the variance of Pt
c and therefore related to inflation. In other words, independent
of the reasons for variations in Pt
c firms will have an incentive to set prices above
the solution in Eq. 2 which further enhances inflation. The next paragraph will
establish the relation between inflation and the markup.
Summary of the empirical hypotheses
From Eq. 18 follows that changes in the markup trigger changes of the price level
in the same direction. Shocks to the markup may arise in Pt
c and can have a
positive, a negative, or no impact on the markup as Eq. 16 implies. However,
irrespective of whether Pt
c has risen or fallen and whether uncertainty is allowed
for or not, the induced variation in ηt means a larger value for Pt
m than it would
have been observed without a shock to Pt
c (see Eq. 19). Moreover, the larger the
variation in the shock to Pt
c, and hence inflation, the larger the variance of ηt and
the larger the increase in Pt
m.
There are thus two channels by which inflation and the markup are linked. The
first is the variance of shocks to ηt which always leads to a rise in Pt
m. Since
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changes in the overall price level, namely due to changes in Pt
c may be responsible
for variations in ηt inflation will again result. Taken together, this implies a positive
relation between inflation and the markup.
The second channel is provided by Eq. 16. For @η@Pc < 0 initial changes in the
overall price level will lead to a decline in ηt and hence in Pt
m. Thus, inflationary
impulses are not reinforced but muted. Naturally, for @η@Pc > 0 the opposite holds.
The actual relationship between inflation and the markup, is therefore given by
the relative importance of the two channels and the actual sign of @η@Pc . In fact, there
may be a positive relation, a negative, or no relation at all. In the empirical model
these possibilities are represented by γ<0, γ>0, or γ=0, respectively. We do not
engage in further scrutinising the theoretically correct sign of this value but leave it
as an empirical question.
Auxiliary analyses
Table 4 Univariate unit root tests
Sample: 1982q4 – 2002q4, T= 81
Variable Lag order Test statistics*
AIC FPE HQ Spec. ADF KPSS
wt 6 6 6 t, 6 −0.53 0.28
Δwt 5 5 1 5 −2.44 0.59
Δ2wt 9 5 0 4 −3.04 0.08
pt 3 3 3 t, 3 −.33 0.51
Δpt 2 2 2 2 −3.60 1.08
Δ2pt 2 2 1 2 −7.68 0.04
πt 3 3 3 3 −3.40 0.21
Δπt 1 1 1 2 −4.51 0.21dmut 3 3 3 3 −2.37 0.46
dmut 2 2 2 2 −4.80 0.05
X^2;t 2 2 2 2 −2.80 1.21
X^2;t 1 1 1 1 −11.60 0.02
"^t 2 2 2 2 −3.31 0.16
"^t 1 1 1 1 −11.10 0.03
"^t 2 2 2 2 −2.00 1.04
"^t 1 1 1 1 −10.89 0.03
Significant test statistics are in bold face. The column ‘spec.’ reports if in addition to an intercept a
time trend (t) and how many lagged endogenous variables entered the test regression. The
columns headed by ‘AIC’, ‘FPE’, ‘HQ’ give the optimal lag lengths according to the commonly
used model selection criteria Akaike information criterion, final prediction error, and Hannan–
Quinn criteria, respectively. Calculations are performed with JMulti 3.11 (see Lütkepohl and
Krätzig 2004)
*‘ADF’ stands for the augmented Dickey–Fuller test and has ‘non-stationarity’ as the null.
‘KPSS’ signifies the test due to Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and tests the null ‘stationarity’ versus
‘non-stationarity’. The 5% critical values are −3.41 and −2.86 for the ‘ADF’ test with and without
trend, respectively, (see MacKinnon 1991) and 0.146 and 0.463 for the KPSS test with and
without trend, respectively (see Kwiatkowski et al. 1992)
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